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Addressing the Explosive Hazard 
Threat in Northern Syria: Risk 
Education on Landmines, UXO, 
Booby Traps, and IEDs 
by Louise Skilling and Marysia Zapasnik [ DCA ]
Explosive hazards pose a great threat to civilians in Syria. A rapid return of displaced people usually oc-curs as soon as an area is declared newly taken. During 
this period, there is limited medical and explosive clearance 
capacity although there are high risks from explosive hazards, 
including booby traps and improvised explosive devices (IED) 
specifically targeting civilians in their homes. This article fo-
cuses on addressing the threat of explosive hazards in north-
ern Syria and draws on risk education material designed by 
humanitarian mine action organization DCA to target adult 
returnees in Syria.
Syrian Context
Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011, hun-
dreds of thousands of people have been killed. The United 
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(UNOCHA) estimates the conflict has displaced 11.3 million 
people—6.3 million within Syria and 4.8 million as refugees. 
Parties to the conflict repeatedly breach international human-
itarian law and international human rights law. In some in-
stances, civilians and civilian infrastructure appear to have 
been directly targeted during attacks.1 The extensive use of ex-
plosive weapons during the six years of conflict poses a grave 
threat to Syrians, first responders, humanitarian operations, 
and livelihood activities. The situation in Syria is highly com-
plex and constantly changing. This is illustrated by the map of 
Syria in Figure 1 and the various actors controlling different 
territories of the country as of 7 June 2017.
   Explosive Contamination in Syria 
Analysis of explosive contamination resulting from the 
conflict in Syria has shown that the types of explosive weap-
ons used are varied and include landmines, various ordnance 
(e.g., artillery), cluster munitions, booby traps, and IEDs.2,3 
According to Action on Armed Violence (AoAV), Syria is one 
of the states most affected by explosive violence, with 86 per-
cent of fatalities between 2011 and 2016 being civilians.4
The International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) define an 
IED as:
A device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner in-
corporating explosive material, destructive, lethal, noxious, 
incendiary, pyrotechnic materials or chemicals designed to 
destroy, disfigure, distract or harass. They may incorporate 
military stores, but are normally devised from non-military 
components.2 
Almost any object can be made into an IED or a booby trap. 
They can be found anywhere and are usually intended to be 
undetectable and designed to target the unwary.
A booby trap is defined by IMAS as:                                              
An explosive or non-explosive device, or other materi-
al, deliberately placed to cause casualties when an appar-
ently harmless object is disturbed or a normally safe act is 
performed.2
IED risk education to recent returnees in northern Syria, 2016.
All graphics courtesy of DCA Syria.
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A few weeks after the end of the hostilities in Kobane, 
northern Syria, a humanitarian worker described the situa-
tion as follows:
The streets were littered with explosives – people had to 
watch every step they took … as more families returned to 
rebuild their lives, reports of incidents involving explosives 
became a daily occurrence. Some victims made it to a medi-
cal facility and survived, but many did not. It was devastat-
ing to witness that for people who had already lost so much, 
there was still more to lose.5
It has been suggested that organized armed groups like the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have no intention of dis-
tinguishing between civilians and combatants. Placing explo-
sive devices in residential homes and specifically targeting 
displaced populations planning to return home would strong-
ly suggest attempts to create fear among the civilian and dis-
placed population.6 This was evident from the attack ISIS 
claimed on the displaced populations gathering to discuss 
returning home to Al-Bab town on 24 February 2017, which 
resulted in 70 fatalities. 
The international community has stressed the ongoing crit-
ical need for humanitarian mine action in Syria through risk 
education and clearance.7,8 IMAS defines mine/ERW risk ed-
ucation as:
Activities that seek to reduce the risk of death and injury 
from mines and ERW, by raising awareness and promot-
ing safe behavior. These activities include information ex-
change with at-risk communities, communication of safety 
messages to target groups, and support for community risk 
management and participation in mine action.2  
At this time there is debate within the mine action commu-
nity whether the topic of IEDs (including IED risk education) 
should be mainstreamed throughout existing international 
standards or whether a separate set of standards needs to be 
developed.9 It is DCA’s point of view that IED risk education 


















Figure 1. Territorial control of Syria by various actors as of 7 June 2017. 
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Rapid Return of Displaced Populations 
to Newly Taken Areas 
The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) captured the city of 
Menbij from ISIS on 12 August 2016. During ISIS’s control of 
Menbij, explosive devices were planted in doorways, refriger-
ators, televisions, water taps, toys, and under clothes and mat-
tresses. Needs and Population Monitoring (an information 
management tool that tracks and assesses the needs of dis-
placed populations within Syria) estimated that 13,220 dis-
placed people returned between 13 August and 7 September 
2016, increasing the total population of Menbij to 86,448 dur-
ing the month of August in 2016.10,11 Between August and 
September 2016 Human Rights Watch recorded 69 civilians 
who were killed by explosive devices in Menbij, 19 of which 
were children.7
Medical data relating to incidents that occurred in Menbij 
during August 2016 showed a dramatic increase in the num-
ber of injuries related to blasts from explosive devices in the 
last three weeks of the offensive, reaching a peak in the week 
following the SDF’s announcement of their full control of the 
city when a large proportion of displaced people began rap-
idly returning to the city. The high rate of injuries and deaths 
caused by explosive hazards in Menbij directly correlates with 
the returning of the displaced population. Incidents peaked 
in mid-August 2016 but then appeared to drop significantly. 
According to local authorities, this was a result of most res-
idents returning to the city that month and then becoming 
acutely aware of the risks posed by explosive devices.5 
In the Medecins Sans Frontieres’ (MSF) report, “Set to 
Explode: Impact of Mines, Booby Traps and Explosive 
Remnants of War on Civilians in Northern Syria,” a resident 
from Jirn describes how his relative was killed when he re-
turned home. “In July 2015, he came back alone to check on 
the situation before allowing his family to join him. When he 
tried to open the door of his house, the whole house exploded. 
He died and his family has still not returned. He wasn’t the 
first one,” the resident said.5 It is evident that IEDs and boo-
by traps were placed by the departing organized armed group 
to target civilians, cause maximum damage, and create fear 
amongst residents intending to return to their homes. 
Land and property grabbing is a common issue within 
emergency situations; and in the context of Syria, this ap-
pears to be a significant concern amongst the displaced pop-
ulation.12 The Global Protection Cluster (an organization 
dedicated to coordinating protection-related responses to 
displaced populations) reports  that explosive hazards and 
housing, land, and property issues are within the top three 
protection concerns for Syrians in 2017.13 This may explain the 
Risk education to rubble clearers in northern Syria, 2016.
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urgency for displaced populations in Syria wishing to return 
to their homes as soon as they perceive it safe to do so. 
Risk education can support civilians returning to their 
homes and their everyday routines. When areas are newly 
taken and the displaced population chooses to return, there 
are limited health care facilities and inadequate medical 
emergency assistance should an incident occur. Through rais-
ing awareness about the threats posed by explosive hazards, 
the risk of injury and death to civilians can be minimized. 
Risk Education Campaigns 
DCA began its humanitarian mine action activities in-
side Syria through local implementing partners in 2014 and 
directly in 2015. As well as clearance actvities in Kobane, 
DCA conducted risk education activities and campaigns in 
Al Ladhiqiyah, Idlib, Aleppo, Ar Raqqah, and Al Hassakah 
governorates in northern Syria. In 2016, DCA provided 
tailor-made and audience-specific risk education to more 
than 68,000 at-risk boys, girls, men, and women using a vari-
ety of different modalities. Safety messages shared during di-
rect sessions were augmented by awareness raising campaigns 
using conventional media, such as radio and televison as well 
as social media. 
Needs and risk assessment. DCA has designed risk edu-
cation campaigns for the Syria response based on needs and 
risk assessments conducted within the targeted locations and 
via liaison with members of the mine action sub cluster and 
United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) Syria. Risk 
education materials were pretested with the local population, 
taking into consideration the local context in relation to the 
appropriate language to be used and the conservative nature 
of the area. DCA developed an internal monitoring and evalu-
ation system to conduct quality assurance and quality control 
in the locations where risk education is delivered.  
Adult returnee risk education material. DCA’s risk edu-
cation campaign includes designing material specifically to 
Risk education to children in northern Syria, 2015.
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target adult returnees. The explosive threat posed to civilians 
in Syria involves landmines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), 
booby traps, and IEDs, or a combination of these explosive 
items; as a result, risk education materials targeting adult re-
turnees have been designed to include all explosive threats. 
As seen in Figure 2, the different categories of explosive items 
are distinguished on the poster. Considering the limited time 
and opportunities that were available to target those return-
ing home, this was considered the most efficient and effective 
approach to raising awarness about the threats posed by ex-
plosive hazards. 
For the risk education materials, all photographs were tak-
en of explosive items from relevant areas in Syria, including 
IEDs. While any object can be made into an IED, and the de-
signs are continually evolving, images of IEDs relevant to the 
geographical location and time period were provided. The 
text above the IED images clarifies that these are only some 
examples, highlighting that these are not an exhaustive rep-
resentation of IEDs. This is similar to displaying images of 
explosive remnants of war (ERW) on risk education materi-
al, as it is not possible to illustrate all of the different colors, 
materials, sizes, and shapes of explosive hazards that could 
pose a risk. 
Risk education material should also provide information on 
what to do if suspicious items are found. However, the clear-
ance capacity within Syria is limited and varies between geo-
graphical locations. Another consideration is that the power 
dynamics are frequently shifting at the local level. For these 
reasons it was decided the simple message report to the local 
authority if suspicious items were found would be used. This 
information will hopefully direct reports of suspicious items 
to clearance assistance if it is available locally while remain-
ing nonpartisan.
The IED threat and the approach required for IED risk edu-
cation varies in different countries, contexts, and periods of 
time. Risk education campaigns in Syria should be tailored for 
the geographical area, specific target group, and phase of the 
conflict. Messages and materials that are currently considered 
appropriate will need to be reviewed as the context evolves. 
Risk education, including raising awareness of IEDs and boo-
by traps is crucial to the humanitarian response in Syria in or-
der to minimize the number of fatalities or injuries caused by 
explosive hazards to displaced and returning civilians.   
See endnotes page 67
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